In this work we focus on a simple database commitment functionality where besides the standard security properties, one would like to hide the size of the input of the sender. Hiding the size of the input of a player is a critical requirement in some applications, and relatively few works have considered it. Notable exceptions are the work on zero-knowledge sets introduced in [MRK03], and recent work on size-hiding private set intersection [ADCT11]. However, neither of these achieves a secure computation (i.e., a reduction of a real-world attack of a malicious adversary into an ideal-world attack) of the proposed functionality.
Introduction
Secure computation. The standard notion of "security" for any multi-party computation [GMW87] involves describing an ideal model where parties have access to a trusted functionality which will carry out the desired computation without revealing any information about the parties' secret inputs and outputs. Then, very informally, given a communication network in the real world, without any trusted functionality, a protocol π securely realizes a multi-party computation if any successful attack by an adversary of π can be translated into a successful attack in the ideal world. Since the latter is trivially secure then π is secure in the real world as well.
Therefore, the real-world/ideal-world paradigm [GMW87] allows one to prove the security of protocols in a simulation-based fashion, with strong security guarantees. This turns out to be very useful when protocols are used as subprotocols and provides robust security when the ideal functionality is correctly designed. All the fundamental primitives have been defined in terms of ideal functionalities and thus they can be securely realized in the real-world/ideal-world paradigm using the general results of [GMW87] .
However the current state-of-the art still does not properly address the issue of considering the size of the input of a player as information to be kept private. Here we consider the problem of hiding the input size in one of the most basic primitives: a commitment scheme.
Secure Database Commitments. Here we address the case where a player wants to commit to a large set of data, and then to partially open that commitment, both without revealing the size of the committed set. More specifically, we consider the setting where a party (the sender) may want to commit to a large elementary database composed by keyvalue pairs, without revealing its size. Then in the opening phase, the sender might want to reveal part of his database one item at a time depending on queries of the receiver. In particular, the receiver will ask for some keys, and the sender wants to convince the receiver of the value associated to each requested key. These partial opening queries should reveal no information about the rest of the database, including the size.
The main question: feasibility of Secure Database Commitments. Following the above discussion, and the fact that we have general results for achieving secure multi-party computation, one could ask the following natural question: "Why should we focus on the design of protocols for secure database commitments if we can use the known constructions for secure two-party computation?". There is a crucial difference between this problem, and the one considered in [GMW87] and in all subsequent work (to the best of our knowledge). Our notion of secure database commitment critically requires that the size of the prover's input must be hidden. In contrast, the [GMW87] definition, according to [Gol04] and to the known constructions, allows a party either at the beginning of or during the computation, to learn the size of the other party's input. This information is actually revealed in all known protocols, mainly because many of the tools used to allow extraction of the adversary's implicit input (e.g., zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge) have communication that depends (polynomial) on the size of the input.
Consequently, traditional results for secure two-party computation cannot be used to obtain secure database commitments, and we need to develop new tools and a significantly new approach. This presents the following interesting open problem: Is the notion of secure database commitment and more generally a meaningful notion of input-size hiding secure computation achievable?
Difficulties in achieving input-size hiding secure computation with standard assumptions. We stress that the main challenge in size-hiding secure computation is as follows: when proving security against a real world adversarial prover, we need to design a simulator which can extract the input from the adversary so that it can provide it to the ideal functionality. At the same time, we can not assume any fixed polynomial upper bound for the size of the input (the protocol should work for any polynomial sized input), and we can not allow the amount of communication to vary with the size of the input.
The real difficulties lie in obtaining a standard security notion (showing an efficient ideal adversary from an efficient real-world adversary), therefore avoiding controversial (sometimes not even falsifiable) conjectures such as random oracles, non-black-box extraction assumptions (e.g., the Diffie-Hellman knowledge of exponent assumption and its variations [HT98]), complexity leveraging (i.e., hardness assumptions against super-polynomial time adversaries) and other non-standard assumptions.
Relationship to Zero-Knowledge Sets. We note that the requirements described for secure database commitments are essentially those given in [MRK03] where Micali, Rabin and Kilian introduced the concept of a zero-knowledge set (ZKS). This primitive allows a party to first commit to a database, and later to answer queries on that database and to prove that the responses are consistent with the original commitment, as in the secure database commitments described above.
However, the definition given by [MRK03] and by all subsequent papers is a propertybased definition that requires: 1) soundness: the commitment should be binding, i.e., for each query there should be only one response for which the prover can give a convincing proof; and 2) zero-knowledge: both the commitment and the proofs should not reveal any information about the rest of the database (beyond the information that is asked in the query), not even the number of elements it contains.
Furthermore, we argue that the constructions they provide (and later constructions for ZKS, see [CHL + 05, CDV06, GM06, CFM08, PX09, LY10]) do not satisfy a typical realworld/ideal-world definition in the spirit of "secure computation". To see this, note that all previous schemes for ZKS included a non-interactive commitment of the set. As mentioned above, we do not consider non-black-box extraction assumptions; moreover, standard non-black-box techniques introduced in [Bar01] so far have been successfully used only in conjunction with interaction.
However, we argue that black-box extraction is impossible for a scheme which is size hiding and has a non-interactive commitment phase. This follows because such a scheme must allow for sets of any polynomial size, which means there will be at least 2 superpoly(k) possible sets; at the same time, the length of the non-interactive commitment must be bounded by a fixed polynomial in k. Thus, a simple counting argument shows that there is no way (based on standard assumptions and security notions) that a simulator can correctly identify the committed set given only the single commitment message. Note that this argument also holds in the CRS model, as long as the CRS is of length polynomial in k, as even in this case the simulator still gets only poly(k) bits of information to identify one database out of 2 superpoly(k) . Therefore, no previous construction of zero-knowledge sets can be proved to be a secure realization of the database commitment functionality (with a black-box simulator).
Looking ahead, in our construction we will avoid these limitations by allowing an interactive commitment phase. The possibility of using interaction was already mentioned in some previous work, but only for the query/proof phase, thus without making any contribution towards addressing this extraction problem. Instead, our goal is to use interaction in the commitment phase, still keeping the query/answer phase non-interactive.
Other related work. Recently similar issues have been considered by Ateniese et al. in [ADCT11] for the problem of Private Set Intersection. However their solution uses random oracles, and obtains security with respect to semi-honest adversaries only. The goal of our work is to obtain security against malicious players as required in secure computation, and we will obtain this result in the standard model using only standard complexity-theoretic assumptions.
Timing attacks. We note that there may be some cases in which any attempt to hide the size of inputs is vulnerable to timing attacks as discussed in [IP07] (in which an adversary can guess the size of the input depending on the amount of time required to perform computations). However, there are many settings where these attacks will have only limited impact. Indeed, notice that since the adversary does not necessarily know the amount of resources of the other player (the committer could perform his computation by distributing the workload among computing devices in number proportional to the size of the input) the timing may in fact give very little information.
Our Results
In this work we first put forth the notion of secure database commitment. Following the traditional notion of "secure computation" we define the natural ideal functionality for database commitment F DbCom and observe that it implies all required security guarantees needed by zero-knowledge sets.
We then present a constant-round protocol that securely realizes the F DbCom functionality. The protocol is interactive, and is secure in the standard model (i.e., we do not require any set-up assumptions) based on the existence of families of collision-resistant hash functions (CRHFs, for short) (notice that CRHFs are implied by the existence of ZK sets [CDV06]).
We stress that our protocol has optimal amortized round complexity, as queries and answers are non-interactive. In addition, the use of the real-world/ideal-world paradigm, and the simulation in polynomial time should make it much easier to use this primitive as part of a larger protocol.
Our construction is based on a special universal argument that enjoys a new proof of knowledge property which is closer to the traditional proof of knowledge property. We define this new property, give a construction which satisfies it based on CRHFs, and show how it can be used to implement secure database commitments. (However, we stress that there were many other subtle issues to address, and our stronger notion of universal argument alone is not sufficient for directly obtaining input-size hiding secure computation.)
Techniques. As described above, the biggest challenge is in defining a simulator that can extract a witness whose length can be any polynomial, from only a fixed polynomial amount of communication. Note that the standard approach does not work in this setting: it might seem that a simple solution would be to ask the sender to give a commitment to the database, and an interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the database contained in the provided commitment. However, in general such proofs may reveal the size of the witness, which in this case means the size of the database.
Instead, we use a different tool, namely a witness indistinguishable universal argument of quasi knowledge (UAQK). A universal argument is a (computationally-sound) proof system which guarantees that the communication is only proportional to the size of the statement. At the same time, it guarantees that the honest prover can run in time polynomial in the size of the witness, which is the best that we can hope for.
Universal arguments were introduced by Barak [Bar01] as part of the design of a nonblack-box simulator. Barak showed a construction based on CRHFs which satisfied a weak proof of knowledge property. However, there are some inherent challenges in defining a standard proof of knowledge for universal arguments, and the extraction guarantees of his definition do not seem to be sufficient for our application. To deal with this we define a new proof of knowledge property which we call "quasi knowledge" which provides a functionality somewhat closer to that of a standard proof of knowledge. We show that it can be used in our application to implement the traditional commitment and proof of knowledge strategy described above. (Of course we are glossing over many issues here, and the application is not straightforward at all -see Section 4 for details.)
Finally, we note that this is of additional interest, because we use universal arguments for a completely different purpose than the one that motivated Barak's original construction [Bar01] , which was the design of a non-black-box simulator.
Universal arguments: from weak proof of knowledge to proof of quasi knowledge. Very informally, the standard proof of knowledge property guarantees that if a prover can convince a verifier of the truthfulness of a theorem with non-negligible probability, then one can efficiently obtain an NP witness for that theorem in expected polynomial time with overwhelming probability.
When one focuses instead on universal languages (i.e., when one would like to prove that a Turing machine accepts the provided input within a given -not necessarily polynomialnumber of steps), then one can not always efficiently obtain a corresponding witness since its length can be superpolynomial. In this case a restricted proof of knowledge property might instead focus on extracting an implicit representation of the witness, in the form of a polynomial-sized circuit that when evaluated on input i provides the i-th bit of the witness.
Unfortunately there is no known construction of a universal argument with such a property. The current state of the art, [BG02], shows how to get a weak proof of knowledge property that includes one more restriction: when a prover proves a theorem with probability 1/q, one can efficiently get an implicit representation of a circuit with probability 1/q that is polynomially related to 1/q. This essentially means that one can efficiently get a candidate implicit representation of a witness, with non-negligible probability when 1/q is non-negligible. However, there is no guarantee that the candidate implicit representation is actually correct (one can not simply test the circuit asking for all bits of the witness since the size of a witness can be superpolynomial).
Furthermore, there is an additional subtlety in the way this weak proof of knowledge property is defined. For any polynomial q, there is guaranteed to be a polynomial time extractor that can extract candidate representations of the witness from any prover that proves a theorem with probability 1/q, and this extractor is guaranteed to succeed with the related probability 1/q ; however, the choice of this extractor and its running time may depend on q. This has two disadvantages: (1) in order to use an extractor, we must first determine which q we are interested in, and (2) an efficient extractor is required to exist only for polynomials q, while nothing is required when q is super polynomial. (In fact, in the construction given in [BG02], the running time of the extractor is roughly q d where d is some constant greater than 1, therefore when q is superpolynomial the running time of the extractor increases quickly and its expected running time is not polynomial). As a result of these disadvantages, converting a weak proof of knowledge system into a proof system with the standard proof of knowledge property is very non-trivial, even when one is happy with the extraction of an implicit representation of the witness. (This is because the standard proof of knowledge property requires that, regardless of the success probability of the adversarial prover, the extractor must run in expected polynomial time.) In this paper we remove the above additional restriction of the weak proof of knowledge property and replace it with a more standard proof of knowledge property, requiring that an extractor outputs in expected polynomial time a correct implicit representation of the witness. The only caveat is that, while we require that the extracted implicit representation must correspond to some true witness, we do allow it to contain a few errors, as long as those errors are unlikely to be noticed by any polynomial time process. (Note that if the witness is polynomial sized, then this still implies the standard proof of knowledge property.) We will say that an argument system is an argument of "quasi" knowledge if it enjoys this property.
Finally, we construct a constant-round witness-indistinguishable universal argument of quasi-knowledge under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions.
Universal Arguments of Quasi Knowledge
A universal argument [BG02] is an interactive argument system for proving membership in NEXP that satisfies a weak proof of knowledge property. For the formal definition, see Appendix A.3. We will use the following result.
Theorem 1 ([BG02, Bar04b], informal) Suppose there exists a hash function ensemble that is collision-resistant against polynomial-sized circuits. Then there exists a universal argument system that is constant-round, public-coin and witness indistinguishable.
Moreover, there exists a construction for which there exists a weak proof of knowledge extractor satisfying two additional properties. First, the construction of this extractor is parameterized by a lower bound α on the success probability of the adversarial prover P n . There exists a fixed constant d (independent of P * ) such that the resulting extractor, that we denote by E P n (α, ·, ·) has expected running time at most ( n α ) d for any n-bit instance y. Furthermore, it has the property that there is a fixed known polynomial q such that for any polynomial-sized prover P n that succeeds in causing verifier V (y) to accept with probability q(n) for an n-bit instance y, and for any α < q(n), the probability that the extractor E P n (α, y, ·) succeeds in extracting bits of a valid witness is at least α q (n) . For details of the construction and proof, see the proof of Lemma A.2.5 in [Bar04b]. 6 2.1 A New Notion: Quasi-Knowledge
As described in Section 1.1, we aim to construct a universal argument with a more standard proof of knowledge property. The resulting proof of knowledge will resemble the standard proof of knowledge property with two exceptions.
The first is that the extractor will produce only an implicit representation of a witness. This is necessary since UAs are used to prove statements that are not necessarily in NP, therefore the length of the witness may not be polynomial, but still we want our extractor to run in (expected) polynomial time. We formalize this saying that the extractor on input i will produce a candidate for the i-th bit of the witness w.
The second difference is that even when the extractor is successful, we do not require that the extracted witness be perfectly correct. We may allow some small fraction of the extracted bits to be incorrect, as long as this will have a negligible effect when used in any polynomial-time process. We formalize this by saying that for any (potentially adversarially and adaptively generated) polynomial sized set of indices I, it must be the case that with all but negligible probability, all of the associated bits produced by the extractor will be correct with respect to some valid witness.
Thus, our definition requires an extractor which satisfies two properties. The first is that, for any PPT (and potentially adversarial) sampling algorithm S which chooses a set of indices I, with all but negligible probability over the choice of random tape r, the extractor E r with oracle access to P will output a set of bits {w i } i∈I that are consistent with some valid witness w. Note that we allow S to choose these indices adaptively, after querying E on indices of it's choice. This allows for the fact that in a larger application, which positions of the witness need to be extracted may depend on the values of the bits which have been seen so far.
The second property requires that the expected running time of E be at most a polynomial factor (in |y|) larger than 1 p(|y|) where p(|y|) is the success probability of the adversarial prover P * . There is a slight issue here in that, even if the expected running time of E(y, i) was guaranteed to be polynomial for each i, it might still be possible that for any choice of random tape r, an adversarial and adaptive sampling algorithm S could find at least one index that causes E r (y, i) to run in super-polynomial time. Thus we also require that the running time be independent of i; this implies that the expected running time of E on any set of inputs (even those that are chosen adversarially and adaptively) will also be at most a polynomial factor larger than 1 p(|y|) . For our application this will be particularly useful, as it implies that E can be converted into a circuit which implicitly describes the witness and whose expected size is at most poly(|y|) p(|y|) . (We will see more details in Section 4.)
Definition of universal argument of quasi knowledge (UAQK). We construct a universal argument P (·, ·), V (·) such that the efficient verification, completeness and computational soundness properties hold as usual, but the weak proof of knowledge property is replaced as follows.
Definition 1 A universal argument system P (·, ·), V (·) for the universal language L U is a universal argument of quasi knowledge (UAQK) if there exists an algorithm E and negligible functions ν 1 , ν 2 such that for any y ∈ L U ∩{0, 1} n , and for any polynomial-size circuit family {P n } n∈N there exists a polynomial poly such that the following two properties hold.
1. For any family {S n } n∈N of polynomial-sized circuits, for sufficiently large n, for any
where the probability is over the choice of the coins r used by E (indeed by E r we mean a run of E with coins r). Note that the same coins are used for all i ∈ I. 1 2. For any n ≥ 2, for any y ∈ L U ∩ {0, 1} n : The running time of E P n (y, i) is independent of the choice of i, and if we let p = Prob[ out V ( P n , V (y) ) = 1 ] > 0, then the expected running time of E P n (y, ·) is at most
, where again the expectation is over the choice of the coins r used by E.
Note that if L U is a language with polynomial-size witnesses, then this property implies proof of knowledge property [FFS88] . The proof of knowledge extractor will first run P n , V (y) once: if V rejects, it will output ⊥, otherwise it will choose a random string r to be used as randomness to run E P r (y, i) for each bit i of the witness, and then output the result when the obtained witness is correct, aborting otherwise. This extractor will have overwhelming success probability when p(y) is non-negligible, and expected running time p(y) · |y| c p(y) = |y| c , which is clearly polynomial. Note also that we could have given a definition that explicitly requires the extractor to run in expected polynomial time, essentially resembling the definitions of the proof of knowledge [FFS88] and weak proof of knowledge [BG02] properties. However, we prefer the above formulation as it makes clear that we can differentiate between (item 1) runs on which the extractor inadvertently produces a bad witness (recall that when the witness is not polynomial-sized, it may not be possible to efficiently identify invalid witnesses) and (item 2) runs on which the extractor aborts (e.g., when the interaction with P n produces an invalid proof or when the extractor gives up in order to keep polynomial is expected running time).
CRHFs ⇒ Constant-Round UAQK
Our approach will be to construct a UAQK out of a regular UA (i.e., enjoying just the weak proof of knowledge property). As mentioned in Section 1.1, there are two difficulties when using the weak proof of knowledge property: (1) we must somehow estimate a lower bound on the success probability of the prover in order to determine which extractor to use, and (2) the running time of the extractor may grow faster than what we would like as compared with the success probability of the prover (here we will use the UA construction of [BG02], which gives an extractor with running time ( |y| α ) d where α is a lower bound on the success probability of P ).
The first issue we will deal with within the design of our extractor; it essentially requires balancing the accuracy of the estimate with the need to compute it in expected polynomial time. In order to address the second issue, we will attempt to increase the success probability of the adversarial prover. Essentially, we will run some instances of that UA sequentially, and accept only if all instances are accepted by the verifier. Then, if the prover succeeds in all instances with probability p, we will argue that there must be at least one instance in which it succeeds with significantly higher probability. If we use this instance, then we can run the extractor with a higher lower bound, and thus obtain a more efficient extractor.
The resulting construction goes as follows. We first ask the prover to commit to a Merkle hash of its witness, and then we run the UA several times sequentially. In each UA, the prover proves both that the statement is true, and that the witness used is consistent with the given commitment, i.e., it proves weak knowledge of a witness and an authentication chain for each bit of the witness. (This will allow us to verify that parts of the witness are consistent with the initial commitment without having to extract the entire witness.)
The actual UAQK. Our construction uses as a subprotocol a universal argument P UA (·, ·), V UA (·) satisfying the conditions described in Theorem 1 for the universal language L U . Let = d+2 where d is the value of the constant defined in Theorem 1 for this UA. We construct a UAQK P new (y, w), V new (y) for language L U as depicted in Fig. 1 .
Proving the Quasi-Knowledge Property
Intuition. At a high level, the proof proceeds as follows: Let p be the probability that the adversarial prover P convinces V new to accept. Then for j = 1, . . . , , let p j be the probability that V new accepts the j-th internal UA instance conditioned on the event that it accepted all previous instances. Then the key observation is that p = j=1 p j , so we are guaranteed that for some j * , p j * ≥ p 1/ . Now, if we could estimate p j * , and identify a UA instance where P succeeds with probability roughly p j * , then we could run the UA extractor with this lower bound, and obtain an extractor with success probability roughly p 1/ q(|y|) (here q is the polynomial referred to as q in the discussion in Theorem 1), and running time roughly (
Then, because we need an extractor with overwhelming success probability, we will run this extractor approximately q(|y|) p 1/ times, to ensure that at least one run will produce bits of a valid implicit witness. 2 The final result will have success probability nearly 1, and running time roughly
(the last equality follows from our choice of ). 3 The main challenge in this process is finding a UA instance where P has success probability roughly p 1/ , and estimating this probability. Essentially, for each j, we want to find a starting state where P is about to begin the j-th UA, and where P 's success probability in that proof is roughly p j ; then we need to identify and take the best of these states (i.e., 2 There is some subtlety here in that we must guarantee that we can always recognize which set of extracted bits is the correct one (the one which is consistent with some valid witness). To do this we make use of the prover's initial commitment to the witness -if the extracted bits are consistent with the initial commitment, then we assume that they are the correct ones.
3 In fact this is slightly inaccurate, as we also need to guarantee, even when we run this extractor many times and boost P 's success probability a bit more, none of these times takes too long. We do this by estimating a reasonable upper bound for the running time of E based on our estimate of P * 's success probability, and stopping E early if it runs more than this number of steps. As a result, we have to run E a few more times, and we set = d + 2.
Players: prover P new , verifier V new . Common input: the statement y ∈ L U , such that |y| = n. Input of P new : witness w for y ∈ L U . Tools: a family {H n } of CRHFs, a statistically hiding trapdoor commitment scheme (SHTGen, SHCom, SHVer, SHTCom, SHTDec), a constant-round statistical ZKAoK P szk (·, ·), V szk (·) , a constant-round WI universal argument P UA (·, ·), V UA (·) (as defined in Theorem 1) with parameter d.
2) V new ↔ P new : V new runs P szk to prove to P new running V szk knowledge of a trapdoor t for η.
3) P new → V new : P new encodes the witness w as follows: Let s = |w| be the length of the original witness w, and let w = w 1 , . . . , w s be the bitwise representation of w. Then P new uses h to form a Merkle hash tree over all the bits of w treating each bit as a leaf node in the tree. Let root be the root of this tree, and for bit w i of witness w, let auth i be the appropriate authentication chain (i.e., all of the values on the path from w i to root, and all of the siblings of those values).
Finally, P new forms the new witness
• y and let L U be the language which accepts (y , w ) iff
• w s • auth s such that (1) s < 2 |y| , (2) (s, dec s ) is a valid decommitment for C s and (root, dec root ) is a valid decommitment for C root with parameter η, (3) for all i = 1 . . . s, auth i is a valid authentication chain for w i with respect to root and hash function h, and (4) w = w 1 . . . , w s is such that (y, w) ∈ L U .
P new sends (C s , C root ) to the verifier.
For j = 1, . . . , = d + 2, sequentially:
4.j) P new and V new run the universal argument P UA (·, ·), V UA (·) for this new language L U . P new will run P UA (y , w ) while V new will run V UA (y ), where
V new outputs 1 iff all instances of V UA (y ) accept. p j * ). We do this as follows: First, for each j, we record many states for P where P has successfully completed the first j −1 UAs and has a reasonable chance of completing the next UA. In Appendix B we show that with overwhelming probability, one of these states will be such that P has probability at least p j /2 of successfully completing the next UA, and at the same time that the time required to collect all these states is at most O(poly(|y|)/p). Next, we attempt to identify one such state, and to estimate the corresponding success probability. We do this by running P from each state many times, and counting how long it takes for P to complete |y| proofs starting from that state. We interleave the counting for all of the states corresponding to the j-th proof to ensure that we can stop as soon as one has resulted in |y| successful proofs. (This allows us to avoid running for too long just because one candidate state was bad.) Finally, we consider the best states for j = 1, . . . , , select the one with the highest estimated success probability, and use it as described above.
Our extractor. To summarize, our extractor works as follows:
1. For each j = 1, . . . , :
(a) Collect n = |y| candidate states, where P has successfully completed the first j − 1 proofs and has a reasonable chance of successfully completing the next one.
(b) Repeatedly run the next UA from all the above n states, and identify the state beststate j that is the first one that reaches n accepting executions of the next
. Let m j be the number of such executions from that state.
2. Given the above m j for j = 1, . . . , , letĵ be the index of the UA where mĵ is minimal.
n 2mĵ is an estimate of a lower bound on the adversarial prover's success probability pĵ in state beststateĵ.
3. Run approximately q(|y|)/pĵ instances of the UA extractor. Return the result that agrees with the initial commitment sent by the prover.
A more formal description of the extractor and a more detailed analysis can be found in the Appendix B. We also note that for technical reasons, we also need a statistically hiding trapdoor commitment scheme and a statistical zero-knowledge argument of knowledge of the trapdoor, which help us to prove the witness indistinguishability of our construction.
Theorem 2 Under the assumption that a family of collision-resistant hash functions exists, then the protocol depicted in Fig. 1 is a constant-round witness-indistinguishable UAQK.
Similarly to our construction, one can also obtain a zero-knowledge UAQK by relying on our techniques on top of the zero-knowledge UA of [Bar04a].
Secure Database Commitments
We consider the notion of a secure database commitment such that each element x appears at most once. As in [MRK03], we will consider a formulation that captures both sets and databases. For a set S, we can define Db[x] to be 1 if x appears in the set and ⊥ if it does not. More generally, for a database of pairs (x, y) (such that each x appears in at most one pair), we define Db[x] to be y if a pair (x, y) appears in the database, and ⊥ if no pair (x, ·) appears. Since the difference between the two primitives is almost cosmetic, we will use the terms of sets and database interchangeably. We will assume that each element x belongs to {0, 1} L and L is polynomial in the security parameter k. Thus, by the requirements above, this means that the database contains at most 2 L entries. We will make no other requirement on the size of the database.
The functionality in question is F DbCom and is the natural extension of the standard commitment functionality, but in F DbCom we must hide the size of the committed message. Furthermore, we will allow for partial openings, in which a verifier can choose a value x, and the the prover will reveal the value of Db [x] . (These partial openings must hide all other information about the database, thus there are also similarities with the zero-knowledge functionality.)
Ideal functionality F DbCom . The database commitment functionality consists of two phases: one in which a prover commits to a database, and a second in which the prover answers queries about that database. Here we will generalize this definition to say that the prover can commit to any database for which he knows an implicit representation. In particular, we will allow the prover to commit to a circuit which evaluates the desired database: it takes as input a string x, and returns Db[x] (which will be ⊥ if x is not in the database).
The formal specification is given in Fig. 2 . For simplicity we assume that all queries made by the honest verifier V are fixed in advance. The definition can be generalized to adaptive queries, where the next query depends on the output of the previous ones. Our construction will satisfy this stronger definition as well.
Remark. Note that our definition of F DbCom does not exclude the possibility that a player is able to commit to a very large (e.g., superpolynomial sized) set, for which he only knows some implicit representation. However, we argue that this does not violate any intuitive security requirement of secure database commitments since the critical requirement is that the prover is committed to some database (whose size is not a priori upperbounded by any fixed polynomial) at the end of the commitment phase, and that it must answer correctly according to this database during the query phase. The construction that we present in Section 4 will require that the honest sender knows an explicit representation of the database he is committing to (i.e., the honest sender runs on input a list of pairs representing the database it wants to commit to). 4 Obtaining a scheme where a real-world honest prover is allowed to have as input a polynomial-sized implicit representation that corresponds to a super-polynomial number of elements is also an interesting direction, and we defer it to future research.
Defining security. In the ideal execution, when initiated with input, parties interact with F DbCom . The adversary Sim has control of a party and thus can deviate from the prescribed computation, while the other player H P follows the prescribed ideal computation. We denote by IDEAL F DbCom H P ,Sim (k, x, z) the output of Sim and H P where Sim runs on input an auxiliary input z, and uniform randomness, while H P runs on input x. Moreover we denote by {IDEAL F DbCom H P ,Sim (k, x, z)} the corresponding ensemble of distributions, with k ∈ N and z ∈ {0, 1} * .
In the real execution parties run a given protocol π. Let H P be the honest party and A be the adversary, which has control of the other party. We denote by
Computation of F DbCom : 1. Upon receiving (Commit, C Db ) from P , if (Commit, C Db ) was already received or if C Db does not describe a circuit with the appropriate number of input and output wires then ignore, otherwise record (C Db ), send (Receipt) to V .
2. Upon receiving (Query, x) from V , if (Commit, C Db ) was previously received from P , then send (Query, x) to P , otherwise ignore.
3. Upon receiving (Open, 1, x) from P , if (Query, x) was not previously sent to P then ignore, otherwise evaluate the circuit C Db on input x to obtain output Db[x], and send (Open,
4. Upon receiving (Open, 0, x) from P , if (Query, x) was not previously sent to P then ignore, otherwise send (Open-Abort, x) to V .
5. Upon receiving (Halt) from V , if the same message was previously received from V then ignore, otherwise send (Halt) to P .
Computation of P :
2. Upon receiving (Query, x) from F DbCom , send (Open, 1, x) to F DbCom .
3. Upon receiving (Halt) from F DbCom go to Output.
3. Upon receiving (Open, x m , y m ) or (Open-Abort, x) from F DbCom , send (Halt) to F DbCom and go to Output.
Output:
P : Output (x 1 , . . . , x t ) where t = poly(k) and x i for 0 < i ≤ t is such that (Query, x i ) is the i-th message received from F DbCom .
V : Output ((x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x m , y m )), where x 1 , . . . , x m was the verifier's input, and each y i for 0 < i ≤ m was part of a message (Open, x i , y i ) received from F DbCom while y i is the empty string in case (Open-Abort, x i ) has been received from F DbCom .
a We stress that inputs can also be computed adaptively. 13 the output of A and H P where A runs on input an auxiliary input z, and uniform randomness, while H P runs protocol π on input x and uniform randomness. Moreover we denote by {EXEC π H P ,A (k, x, z)} the corresponding ensemble of distributions, with k ∈ N , x ∈ {0, 1} poly(k) and z ∈ {0, 1} * .
Definition 2 A protocol π securely realizes the functionality F DbCom if for any real-world adversary A there exists an ideal-world adversary Sim such that for every sufficiently large k, for every x ∈ {0, 1} poly(k) and for every z ∈ {0, 1} * , {EXEC π H P ,A (k, x, z)} and {IDEAL
Constant-Round Secure Database Commitments
In this section we present a constant-round protocol that securely realizes the F DbCom functionality. Our construction uses a constant-round zero-knowledge argument of knowledge (ZKAoK) for all NP, a constant-round WI universal argument of quasi knowledge, a 2-round trapdoor commitment scheme, and a zero-knowledge set scheme with two additional properties. As all of these ingredients can be instantiated through CRHFs, this gives a secure realization of F DbCom based only on CRHFs. An additional feature of our protocol is that the amortized round complexity of a proof is optimal (i.e., proofs are actually non-interactive).
Zero-knowledge sets. We start by reviewing a major building block for our construction: zero-knowledge sets. At a high level, a non-interactive zero-knowledge set scheme is composed of four algorithms as follows: an algorithm ZKSSetup, which generates some parameters, an algorithm ZKSCom, which commits to a database in a size independent way, an algorithm ZKSProve, which allows the owner of the database to prove that a particular query response was consistent with the committed database, and an algorithm ZKSVerify for verifying such proofs. We will also use "ZKS proof system" to refer to the interaction between ZKSProve and ZKSVerify.
We will use non-interactive zero-knowledge sets as a building block in our construction of secure database commitment. In Appendix A.4 we give a definition for zero-knowledge sets which is similar to that in [CHL + 05]. We also define a somewhat stronger hiding property (which we call special zero knowledge), in which zero knowledge holds for all valid parameters output by the simulator set-up algorithm, and the simulated commitment is an honest commitment to an empty database. In Appendix C we will discuss how to achieve these properties based on CRHFs. We finally stress that even though non-interactive zeroknowledge sets have been defined in the common reference string model, we will use them in the standard model by using interaction.
Intuition for our protocol. The basic idea behind this construction is fairly straightforward: we give a concise commitment to the database (using the ZKS commitment algorithm), and use a universal argument of quasi knowledge to prove knowledge of a valid opening. Then we can use the ZKS proof system to respond to queries.
However, we need an additional property from the ZKS proof system to make this work. The issue is that when we are dealing with a corrupt prover, we need to be able to extract a circuit representation of the committed database from the UAQK (by which we mean a circuit which on input x returns Db[x]). On the other hand, recall that the UAQK only allows us to query the witness one bit at a time. Thus, we need the ZKS to have the additional property that the committer can generate a well-formed witness string. In particular, we need to guarantee that the witness will be in a format such that we can efficiently extract Db[x] for any x given only the UAQK extractor which allows queries to individual bits of the witness. Furthermore, in order to argue that the responses in the query phase must be consistent with the extracted database, we also need to be able to efficiently extract a ZKS proof for each x. This must again be done by just querying the circuit representation. Thus, we will define the notion of a ZKS scheme that allows local witnesses to capture these requirements.
Definition 3 A ZKS proof system (ZKSSetup, ZKSCom, ZKSProve, ZKSVerify) allows local witnesses if there exist additional polynomial-time deterministic algorithms FormWitness, TMVer, Eval, PfGen such that the following properties hold:
Witness verifiability. For any sufficiently large k, for all polynomial sized Db, and random strings r,
w ← FormWitness(ZKSPAR, Db, r) : TMVer(ZKSPAR, zks, w) = 1] = 1.
Local evaluation. There exists a polynomial q such that for any sufficiently large k, for any x ∈ {0, 1} k and w ∈ {0, 1} 2 k , Eval(x, w) only accesses q(k) bits of w and runs in time polynomial in k.
Local verification. There exists a polynomial q such that for any sufficiently large k, x ∈ {0, 1} k and w ∈ {0, 1} 2 k , PfGen(x, w) only accesses q (k) bits of w and runs in time polynomial in k. Moreover for any x ∈ {0, 1} k and w ∈ {0, 1} 2 k and polynomial sized zks,
The intuition of the above definition is that there must exist a procedure FormWitness that transforms the witness while still preserving the content of the database; TMVer verifies that this transformation has been correctly computed. Moreover one can extract the membership or non membership of an element and the corresponding proof by accessing only a polynomial number of bits of this witness, according to the algorithms Eval and PfGen. The reason why we allow w to be of superpolynomial size is that the adversary can bypass the procedure FormWitness and produce a circuit that implicitly represent a superpolynomial sized witness. The interesting property of our definition is that even in this case, Eval and PfGen will be efficient.
Previous ZKS schemes allow local witnesses. We now show that standard constructions of ZKS ([MRK03, CHL + 05, CDV06]) have this property. We will use ideas from the ZKS construction of [MRK03, CHL + 05]. We summarize only the main properties we need.
The constructions work by building a tree. For each x in the database, we parse x as bits b 1 , . . . , b L . Then at position b 1 , . . . , b L in the tree (where b i = 0 denotes the left branch and b i = 1 denotes the right branch at level i), we store a commitment v x to the corresponding y (all commitments here use a special commitment scheme). We construct the tree from the bottom up. For every ancestor x = b 1 , . . . , b i of such an x, we compute a commitment to a hash of the two children: v x = Com(h(v x ||0 ||v x ||1 )). If one of the children has not yet been specified (it is the root of a subtree with no leaves in the database), we set that child node to Com(⊥).
Then a proof for value (x, y) ∈ Db can be formed by producing all sibling and ancestor nodes and openings for all ancestor commitments. A proof for value x / ∈ Db is more complex, but it can be formed by first finding the root of the largest empty subtree containing x. The value of this root node (call it x ⊥ ) should be ⊥. Then the proof will include all sibling and ancestor nodes of x ⊥ , special openings of all ancestor commitments, and an additional value which can be constructed given x and the randomness used to form the commitment at x ⊥ .
More formally there exists a procedure PfGen * such that for every empty subtree, there exists a polynomial sized string info, such that for all leaves x in this subtree, PfGen * (x, info) produces output identical to the part of the output of ZKSProve corresponding to such a subtree. It is also possible to efficiently verify that info is a legitimate string for running PfGen * (x, info) on any leaf x belonging to the empty subtree. We now sketch the necessary algorithms as defined in Definition 3: FormWitness : will first form the ZKS tree as described above. Then we will transform this into a single linear witness. For each nonempty, non-⊥ node x in the tree we will form an entry consisting of the value of v x , the values of its children, the opening of the commitment v x , and the positions in this witness string where the entries for each of the children nodes begin. For each ⊥ node, we form an entry with the commitment v ⊥ and the extra info necessary to open the commitment. The witness will begin with the bit position of the entry corresponding to the root commitment.
TMVer: will traverse the entire tree (stopping at the roots of empty subtrees), and verify all commitments and hashes. This algorithm can easily be described by a polynomial sized TM.
Eval(x): will follow the path through the tree corresponding to x, beginning with the root and continuing until it reaches either ⊥ or a leaf node with value y, and return the result.
PfGen(x, w): will follow the path through the tree corresponding to x until it reaches an empty subtree or a leaf. If it is a leaf, it will return all of the ancestor and sibling nodes and the openings, as described above. If it is an empty subtree, it reads the accompanying value info, runs PfGen * (x, info) → π and returns all the ancestor and sibling nodes and openings, followed by π. In both cases the output for an honestly generated witness will be identical to the output of ZKSProve.
Our construction. We will use a constant-round zero-knowledge argument of knowledge (ZKAoK) P(·, ·), V(·) , a constant-round WI UAQK UAP(·, ·), UAV(·) , a special ZKS (ZKSSetup, ZKSCom, ZKSProve, ZKSVerify) which allows local verification with zero knowledge simulator (ZKSSimSetup, ZKSSimCom, ZKSSimProve) and a 2-round trapdoor commitment scheme (TGen, Com, TCom, TDec, Ver). A description of our scheme is found in Fig. 3 .
send (ZKSPAR, crs) to P .
V ↔ P :
V proves knowledge of ZKSTRAP, aux (i.e., V and P run P((ZKSPAR, crs), (ZKSTRAP, aux)) and V((ZKSPAR, crs)) respectively).
If P rejects the proof, then it aborts.
and send c to V .
4. P ↔ V : P execute FormWitness(ZKSPAR, Db, r) to generate witness w. Let UAP, UAV be a UAQK that proves quasi knowledge of a witness of the form zks||dec||w, where zks, dec is a valid opening for commitment c under crs, and w is such that TMVer(ZKSPAR, zks, w) accepts. Then P will execute the code of UAP on input c||ZKSPAR||crs with witness zks||dec||w while V executes the code of UAV on input c||ZKSPAR||crs. If UAV rejects, V aborts.
P → V
: open the commitment c by sending zks, dec to V . V runs Ver(crs, c, dec, zks) and if the output is 0, it aborts.
Query/Answer Phase:
For i = 1, . . . , m do:
6. V → P : send x i to P . Round optimality. Simply by inspection one can observe that the query/proof phase is non-interactive (optimal).
Security. The protocol depicted in Fig. 3 securely realizes the F DbCom functionality, i.e., it is a constant-round protocol for secure database commitment. For lack of space the proof is presented in Appendix D.
Theorem 3 If P(·, ·), V(·) is a ZKAoK, (ZKSSetup, ZKSCom, ZKSProve, ZKSVerify) is a special zero-knowledge set scheme which allows local witnesses, UAP(·, ·), UAV(·) is a WI UAQK and (TGen, Com, TCom, TDec, Ver) is a 2-round trapdoor commitment scheme, then the protocol depicted in Fig. 3 securely realizes the F DbCom functionality.
Corollary 1 Under the assumption that there exists a family of CRHFs, then there exists an efficient protocol which securely realizes the F DbCom functionality. This follows from the fact that all of the primitives mentioned in Theorem 3 can be realized based on CRHFs.
[Bar04a] Boaz Barak. 
A Definitions and Tools in Details
A polynomial-time relation R is a relation for which it is possible to verify in time polynomial in |x| whether R(x, w) = 1. Let us consider an NP-language L and denote by R L the corresponding polynomial-time relation such that x ∈ L if and only if there exists w such that R L (x, w) = 1. We will call such a w a valid witness for x ∈ L. A negligible function ν(k) is a non-negative function such that for any constant c < 0 and for all sufficiently large k, ν(k) < k c . We will call a positive function non-negligible if it is not a negligible function. We will call a positive function overwhelming if it can be described as 1 − ν for some negligible function nu. We will denote by Prob r [ X ] the probability of an event X over coins r.
Indistinguishability.
Definition 4 Two ensembles of distributions X = {X k } and Y = {Y k } ranging over {0, 1} poly(k) are computationally indistinguishable if for any polynomial-sized circuit D there exists a negligible function ν such that
Chernoff Bounds. We use the following versions of Chernoff Bounds. Let X 1 , . . . , X n be independent Poisson trials with Prob[
Let X 1 , . . . , X n be independent Poisson trials with Prob[ X i = 1 ] = p i . Then if X is the sum of all X i and if µ is E[X], for any δ > 0 :
Markov's inequality. Let X be a non-negative discrete random variable, and let a be a positive real number, then
A.1 Commitment Schemes
We now give definitions for several notions of commitment schemes. For readability we will use "for all m" to mean any possible message m of length polynomial in the security parameter. We start with the standard notion of commitment scheme with its two main variants (i.e., unconditionally binding and unconditionally hiding). Note that all definitions will use a commitment generator function that outputs the commitment parameters. 
If the binding property holds with respect to a computationally unbounded algorithm committer, the commitment scheme is said statistically binding; if instead, the hiding property holds with respect to a computationally unbounded algorithm receiver, the commitment scheme is said statistically hiding. When crs is clear from context, we often say "m, dec is a valid opening for com" to mean that Ver(crs, com, dec, m) = 1.
We now give the definition of trapdoor commitment scheme. In particular we strengthen the computational indistinguishability of the computed commitments so that it holds even in case the distinguisher takes as input the trapdoor information. This allows one to use the same commitment parameters for any polynomial number of commitments (and actually all our results hold in this stronger setting).
Definition 6 (TGen, Com, TCom, TDec, Ver) is a trapdoor commitment scheme (TCS, for short) if TGen(1 k ) outputs a pair (crs, aux), Gen crs is the related algorithm that restricts the output of Gen to the first element crs, (Gen crs , Com, Ver) is a commitment scheme and TCom and TDec are polynomial-time algorithms such that: -trapdoorness: for all m and all pairs (crs, aux) given in the output space of TGen, the probability distribution
(crs, aux, com , dec , m)} even when receiver and the distinguisher have access to aux.
A.2 Interactive proof/argument systems with efficient prover strategies.
An interactive proof (resp., argument) system for a language L is a pair of probabilistic polynomial-time interactive algorithms P and V , satisfying the requirements of completeness and soundness. Informally, completeness requires that for any x ∈ L, at the end of the interaction between P and V , where P has as input a valid witness for x ∈ L, V rejects with negligible probability. Soundness requires that for any x ∈ L, for any (resp., any polynomial-sized) circuit P , at the end of the interaction between P and V , V accepts with negligible probability. We denote by out V ( P (x, w) , V (x) ) the output of the verifier V when interacting on common input x with prover P that also receives as additional input a witness w for x ∈ L. Moreover we denote by out V ( P , V (x) ) the output of the verifier V when interacting on common input x with an adversarial prover P . Given a security parameter k, we will use inputs x of length n where n = poly(k).
Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 7 A pair of interactive algorithms P (·, ·), V (·) is an interactive proof (resp., argument) system for the language L, if V runs in probabilistic polynomial-time and the following properties hold. Completeness: for every x ∈ L and for every NP witness w for
Soundness (resp. computational soundness): for every (resp., every polynomial-sized) circuit family {P n } n∈N there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that
for every x ∈ L of size n.
Since all protocols we give are actually argument (rather than proof) systems, we will now focus on argument systems only. Therefore even when we use the word "proof", we will actually mean "computationally-sound" proof. Also from now on we assume that all interactive algorithms are probabilistic polynomial-time, including the honest prover.
Arguments of knowledge. Informally, an argument system is an argument of knowledge if for any probabilistic polynomial-time interactive algorithm P there exists a probabilistic algorithm called the extractor, such that 1) the expected running time of the extractor is polynomial-time regardless of the success probability of P ; 2) if P has non-negligible probability of convincing a honest verifier for proving that x ∈ L, where L is an NP language, then the extractor with overwhelming probability outputs a valid witness for x ∈ L.
Zero knowledge. The classical notion of zero knowledge has been introduced in [GMR89]. In a zero-knowledge argument system a prover can prove the validity of a statement to a verifier without releasing any additional information. This concept is formalized by requiring the existence of an expected polynomial-time algorithm, called the simulator, whose output is indistinguishable from the view of the verifier.
We start by defining the concept of a view of an interactive Turing machine. Let A and B be two interactive Turing machines that run on common input x and assume that A and B have additional information z A and z B . We denote by View A B (x, z A , z B ) the random variable describing the view of B; that is, B's random coin tosses, internal state sequence, and messages received by B during its interaction with A.
We are now ready to present the notion of a zero-knowledge argument.
Definition 8 An interactive argument system P (·, ·), V (·) for a language L is computational (resp., statistical, perfect) zero-knowledge if for all polynomial-time verifiers V , there exists an expected polynomial-time algorithm S such that the following ensembles are computationally (resp., statistically, perfectly) indistinguishable:
w∈W (x),z∈{0,1} and {S(x, z)} x∈L,z∈{0,1} .
Witness Indistinguishability Let Π = P (·, ·), V (·) be an argument system for language L. A witness indistinguishability adversary V for Π receives as input x ∈ L, w 0 , w 1 ∈ W (x) and auxiliary information z. V interacts with machine P that has a bit b ∈ {0, 1} wired-in. P receives as input (x, w 0 , w 1 ) and executes the code of the honest prover P on input (x, w b ). For b ∈ {0, 1}, we denote by WIExpt b P,V (x, w 0 , w 1 , z) the random variable describing the output of V when interacting on input (x, w 0 , w 1 , z) with prover P running on input (x, w 0 , w 1 ) and b is the wired-in bit of P .
Definition 9 Argument system Π = P (·, ·), V (·) for the language L is witness indistinguishable if for all probabilistic polynomial-time witness indistinguishability adversaries V there exists a negligible function ν such that for all x ∈ L, all pairs of valid NP witnesses w 0 , w 1 for x ∈ L and all z ∈ {0, 1}
A.3 Universal Arguments
A universal argument is an interactive argument system for proving membership in NEXP.
We give now the formal definitions.
Definition 10 Given a description of a non-deterministic Turing machine M , a string x and a number t we say that ( M, x, t ) ∈ L U if M accepts the input x within t steps. We can also consider the witness-relation for L U denoted by R U : the pair ( M, x, t , w) is in R U if M is a two-input deterministic Turing machine that accepts the input (x, w) within t steps. Moreover, we define T M (x, w) to be the number of steps made by M on input (x, w).
Definition 11 [BG02]
A universal-argument system is an argument system P (·, ·), V (·) such that: Efficiency: there exists a polynomial q such that for any y = M, x, t , the total time spent by the verifier strategy V , on input y, is at most q(|y|). In particular, all messages exchanged in the protocol have length smaller than q(|y|).
Completeness: for every ( M, x, t , w) ∈ R U , Prob[ out V ( P ( M, x, t , w), V ( M, x, t ) ) = 1 ] = 1. Moreover, there exists a polynomial q such that for all ( M, x, t , w) ∈ R U , it is guaranteed that P ( M, x, t , w) runs in at most q(T M (x, w)) ≤ q(t) steps.
Soundness: For every polynomial-size circuit family {P n } n∈N and every string y = M, x, t ∈ {0, 1} n \L U , it holds that Prob[ out V ( P n , V (y) ) = 1 ] < ν(n) where ν is a negligible function.
Weak Proof of Knowledge: For every positive polynomial q there exists a positive polynomial q and a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm E, called the extractor, such that the following holds. For every polynomial-size circuit family {P n } n∈N , and every y = M, x, t ∈ {0, 1} n , if Prob[ out V ( P n , V (y) ) = 1 ] ≥ 1/q(|y|) then
where R U (y) is defined as {w : (y, w) ∈ R U }, E P n (·, ·) denotes that E has oracle access to P n and the above probability is over the coins used by E.
Loosely speaking, a universal argument is a computationally sound proof system for NEXP.
A.4 Zero-Knowledge Sets
In [MRK03] zero-knowledge sets and elementary databases were defined. We now present a definition for zero-knowledge sets which is similar to that in [CHL + 05] but includes a special hiding property, in which zero knowledge holds for all valid parameters output by the simulator set-up algorithm. We also require that the simulated commitment is an honest commitment to an empty database. These additional properties can be achieved still using CRHFs which is the minimal assumption for ZK sets.
Definition 12 Algorithms ZKSSetup, ZKSCom, ZKSProve, ZKSVerify constitute a special zeroknowledge set scheme if they satisfy the following properties:
Completeness. 
B Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 Under the assumption that a family of collision-resistant hash functions exists, then the protocol depicted in Fig. 1 is a constant-round WI UAQK. We prove this statement in two steps. First, we demonstrate that the protocol is a witness indistinguishable universal argument, then we show that it satisfies the quasi-knowledge property.
B.1 P new (·, ·), V new (·) Is a Universal Argument
Theorem 4 Under the assumption that a family of collision-resistant hash functions exists, the protocol P new (·, ·), V new (·) depicted in Fig. 1 is a constant-round WI universal argument.
Proof. Efficiency and completeness follow from the corresponding properties of P UA (·, ·), V UA (·) , which are preserved under sequential composition and from the corresponding properties of the commitment scheme and of the zero-knowledge argument of knowledge. The fact that CRHFs suffice, follow from Theorem 1 which provides the underlying constant-round witness indistinguishable universal argument with special properties under CRHFs, from the fact that constant-round statistical zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge exist for all NP under CRHFs, and from the fact that constant-round statistically hiding trapdoor commitments can be instantiated using CRHFs (see Appendix C).
Witness indistinguishability. We prove the witness indistinguishability of P new (·, ·), V new (·) , by contradiction. We assume that there exists a pair of different witnesses w 0 , w 1 such that there exists a verifier V new and a distinguisher D such that D distinguishes an execution of P new (y, w 0 ), V new (y) from an execution of P new (y, w 1 ), V new (y) . We now show that hybrid games connect the two executions and therefore the success of D produces a contradiction of one of the underlying complexity-theoretic assumptions. Game 1: this is the game where the prover is P new (y, w 0 ). Here the witness w 0 is used both for producing the commitments C s , C root of s, root and for producing the actual witness to be used in the executions of P UA (·, ·), V UA (·) .
Game 2: this is similar to Game 1, but we also require that P new (y, w 0 ) runs the extractor of the proof of knowledge of the trapdoor given by V new . The trapdoor however is not used by P new (y, w 0 ). It is easy to see that a distinguisher between Game 2 and Game 1 would contradict the proof of knowledge (specifically, the fact that the success probability of the extractor essentially corresponds to the success probability of the prover) property of the statistical zero-knowledge argument of knowledge in which the verifier proves knowledge of the trapdoor.
Game 3: this is similar to Game 2, but we also require that commitments are performed by using the trapdoor. Notice that commitments are compatible (in the statistical sense) both with the ones of P new (y, w 0 ) and with the ones of P new (y, w 1 ). The experiment continues still using w 0 for producing a witness in P UA (·, ·), V UA (·) . It is easy to see that a distinguisher between Game 3 and Game 2 would contradict the statistical trapdoorness of C s , C root . Game 4: this is similar to Game 3, but this time w 1 is used for producing a witness in P UA (·, ·), V UA (·) . It is easy to see that a distinguisher between Game 3 and Game 4 would contradict the witness indistinguishability of P UA (·, ·), V UA (·) .
Game 5: this is similar to Game 4, but this time w 1 is used both for producing the commitments C s , C root of s, root and for producing the actual witness to be used in the executions of P UA (·, ·), V UA (·) . It is easy to see that a distinguisher between Game 5 and Game 4 would break the statistical trapdoorness of the commitment scheme.
Game 6: this is similar to Game 5, but the trapdoor is not used and the commitments therefore correspond to w 1 . It is easy to see that a distinguisher between Game 6 and Game 5 would break the statistical trapdoorness of the commitment scheme.
Game 7: this is similar to Game 6, but the trapdoor is not extracted. It is easy to see that a distinguisher between Game 7 and Game 6 would contradict the proof of knowledge (specifically, the fact that the success probability of the extractor essentially corresponds to the success probability of the prover) property of the statistical zero knowledge argument of knowledge in which the verifier proves knowledge of the trapdoor.
Since Game 7 corresponds to an execution of P new (y, w 1 ), V new (y) , we have shown that the existence of D contradicts the security of one of the complexity-theoretic assumptions used in our construction.
Soundness. Assume by contradiction that an adversary P can prove to V new a false statement y with non-negligible probability p. By succeeding with probability p in P UA (·, ·), V UA (·) , P also succeeds with probability at least p in proving the first UA P UA (·, ·), V UA (·) . The instance of this UA is y and is different than y, but it still includes the truthfulness of y. Indeed, the instance y proves that the instance y is correct and moreover, one can also extract bits of the witness in expected polynomial time. Therefore, if y is a false instance then y is a false instance too. It is therefore immediate the reduction from an adversary P that breaks the soundness of P new (·, ·), V new (·) for a false instance y of its choice to an adversary P U A that breaks the soundness of the underlying universal argument P UA (·, ·), V UA (·) for a false instance y of its choice. 2
B.2 P new (·, ·), V new (·) Is a Universal Argument of Quasi Knowledge
We focus here on showing that the new argument system is an argument of quasi knowledge.
Theorem 5 Under the assumption that a family of collision-resistant hash functions exists, the protocol P new (·, ·), V new (·) depicted in Fig. 1 is an argument of quasi knowledge.
Proof. We must show that there exists an extractor E new which satisfies the conditions of Definition 1. (Recall that E new on input y, running with randomness r and with access to a polynomial-sized circuit P aims to provide an implicit representation of the witness.) We first present some notation and a couple useful lemmas based on Chernoff bounds, then describe our extractor E new in detail in Fig. 4 , and finally show in Propositions 1 and 2 that it satisfies the properties described in Definition 1. Notation: We let P ∈ {P n } n∈N be a potentially adversarial prover, y be an input statement, and n = |y|. Let σ(n) be the combined bit length of s, dec s , root, dec root , w i , auth i . (Note that this must be polynomial.) We also let T new (n) be the running time of the UAQK verifier V new . As this is guaranteed to be polynomial in n (by definition of UA), we let c new be a constant such that T new (n) is O(n cnew ).
Recall that step 4 of our UAQK protocol runs a UA protocol times sequentially. We will define the output of step 4.j in an execution of our UAQK protocol to be ACCEPT iff V UA outputs 1 in step 4.j.
For simplicity of notation, in what follows we denote by p(n, y) the success probability of P when interacting with V new (y) where the probability is over the honest verifier's random coins. (We will omit n, y when it is clear from context.) Furthermore, let p 1 (n, y) be the probability that when we run the honest V new algorithm with prover P , the output of step 4.1 is ACCEPT. For j = 2, . . . , , let p j (n, y) be the probability that when we run V new with P , the output of step 4.j will be ACCEPT, conditioned on the event that the output of steps 4.1 -4.(j − 1) was also ACCEPT. Note that V new accepts iff all instances of V UA accept, i.e. if steps 4.1 -4. output ACCEPT, therefore p(n, y) = j=1 p j (n, y) for all n, y.
Useful lemmas. The following lemmas will be useful in the analysis of our extractor.
Lemma 1 Let E be an experiment which succeeds with probability p. Then if we run independent trials of this experiment 2n/p times, the probability that we obtain fewer than n successes is less than ( e 2 ) −n .
Proof. Let X i be a variable which is 1 if the ith experiment succeeds, and 0 if it fails, and let X = 2n/p i=1 X i . We want to show that Prob[ X < n ] < ( e 2 ) −n . Chernoff bounds tell us that if µ is E[X], then for any δ ∈ (0, 1] :
In our case E[X] = p · 2n/p = 2n. So if we consider δ = 1/2, then we get
Lemma 2 Let E be an experiment which succeeds with probability p. Then if we run independent trials of this experiment n 2p times, the probability that we obtain at least n successes is less than 2( 4 e ) −n/2 .
Proof. Let X i be a variable which is 1 if the ith experiment succeeds, and 0 if it fails, and let X = n/2p i=1 X i . We want to show that Prob[ X > n − 1 ] < ( 4 e ) −n/2 . Chernoff bounds tell us that if µ is E[X], then for any δ > 0 :
as desired. Here the second to last implication follows because (1 + 1/x) x < e for all x ≥ 1. 2
Now we argue that E new satisfies the UAQK property described in Definition 1. We must show that (1) E new P (y, i) has running time that is independent of i, and expected running time poly(n) p , for some fixed polynomial poly, and (2) that there is some negligible function ν such that whenever p > ν(n) , then for any polynomial-time generated set of indices I, with overwhelming probability 1 − ν(n), w i ← E new P (y, i) is such that all outputs {w i } i∈I are consistent with some valid witness w.
Outline of the proof. The high level structure of our proof will be as follows. First we will analyze the running time of our extractor. We will argue in Claim 1 that by Chernoff bounds it will not take too long to find n successful states, so step 1a will have the appropriate expected running time. Then we argue, again by Chernoff bounds, that the expected value of mĵ (Lemma 4), and so the expected running time of step 1b will also be as desired (Claim 2). Finally, some arithmetic shows that as long as all values mĵ are not too large, the running time of step 2 will also be appropriate (Claim 3). Combining these three claims proves that the running time is as desired (Proposition 1).
Next, we analyze the success probability of our extractor. First, we argue by Markov's inequality and the properties of the UA considered in Theorem 1, that if α = n 2mĵ is in fact a lower bound for the success probability of P , then with overwhelming probability we will get at least one random tape r such that E r both finishes within γ steps and produces valid bits when we try to extract w i and its associated authentication chain (Claim 5). Next, we show again by Chernoff bounds that with overwhelming probability, α will be a good lower bound for the success probability of P (Claim 6). Then we use these claims to argue that, there a negligible function such that whenever p > ν(n) is non-negligible, E new will produce correct output on all indices chosen by S with probability 1 − ν(n) (Claims 7,
28
E new P (y, i). For j = 1 . . . repeat the following steps.
1. Run V new (y), P , pausing after step 4.(j − 1) to record the state of P * and V new at that point. If steps 4.1 -4.j all output ACCEPT, then store the recorded state as state (j)
1 . Rewind P and run V new (y), P again from the beginning (using new random coins for V new ), and continue this process until n states state u results an execution which outputs ACCEPT on step 4.j. When the first of these counters reaches n, store the associated state state (j) u as beststate j . Also store as value m j the number of times we had to restart P * from state state (j)
1 . If at any point the above step requires running the UAQK protocol more than ( e 2 ) n/ times, then immediately halt, and output ⊥.
Letĵ be such that mĵ is minimized. Let E be an extractor (given by the weak proof of knowledge property) for P UA (·, ·), V UA (·) , and let d, q be the associated constant and polynomial as described in Theorem 1. a Compute α = n 2mĵ , Θ = 4 · mĵ · q(n), and γ = 2(2mĵ) −1 q(n). Let P best represent P restarted from state beststateĵ. Parse the rest of the random tape r into Θ values r 1 , . . . r Θ , and repeat the following process Θ times. For each iteration θ = 1 . . . Θ: For each of the σ(n) values for x representing one of the bit positions of s, dec s , root, dec root , w i , auth i , use coins r θ for E and run E P best (α, y , x) for exactly γ steps b . If for any of the σ(n) values, E does not halt in that time, consider the output of this iteration to be ø. Otherwise, verify the extracted s, dec s , root, dec root with respect to C s , C root , and the extracted w i , auth i with respect to root. If the verification succeeds, consider the output of this iteration to be w i , otherwise consider it to be ø. Once all iterations have been completed, if any two iterations produced w i = w * i such that w i = ø and w * i = ø, or if all iterations produced ø, then output ø. Otherwise output the unique w i = ø produced in one or more iterations.
a Recall that d is the constant which describes how the choice of α affects the running time of the resulting extractor E, and q is the polynomial which relates the success probabilities of P and E.
b If E runs for less time, we just wait until the equivalent amount of time has passed. ). This follows from collision resistance of the hash function, the binding property of the commitment scheme, and statistical zero knowledge property of the proof system used to prove knowledge of the commitment trapdoor (and this is where we need S to be polynomial time). Combining these claims demonstrates the necessary success probability (Proposition 2).
Running time of the proof of quasi-knowledge extraction procedure. We begin by analyzing the running time of E new .
Proposition 1 There exists a polynomial poly such that for all n ∈ N, for any y ∈ L U ∩ {0, 1} n , any i ∈ {0, 1} n , and any circuit P n , the running time of E new P (y, i) is independent of i and if p(n) = Prob[ out V ( P n , V new (y) ) = 1 ] > 0 then the expected value of this running time is at most poly(n) p(n) .
Proof.
First we define some additional notation, and prove two lemmas about the values m j and state (j) u that E new computes in step 1 that we will use in our analysis below. Additional Notation: First, for any initial state state (j) corresponding to the end of step 4.(j − 1), let ρ state (j) be the probability that when we restart the protocol from state state (j) , step 4.j outputs ACCEPT. Second, recall that E new may halt in step 1a or 1b if it has to run the UAQK too many times. For simplicity of notation, if for any j, E new halts before setting m j , we will consider m j to be ( e 2 ) n/ /n . Lemma 3 For any j ∈ 1, . . . , and any u ∈ 1, . . . n, let state (j) u be generated as described in step 1a of Fig. 1 
Fix a value of j. Let D (j) be the distribution over states that results from choosing random coins for the verifier and outputting the state state of P after step 4.(j − 1) of the protocol. Let E 1 , . . . , E j be the event that steps 4.1, . . ., 4.j resp. output ACCEPT during a given run of the UAQK. Now, the process in step 1a of the extractor E new can be described as choosing state ← D (j) conditioned on E 1 , . . . , E j . Let bad be the set of states such that ρ state < p j /2, and let D (j) be the distribution over states that results from step 1a of E new . Now, for any u ∈ 1, . . . , n:
5 See notation section at the beginning of the proof of this section for a definition of pj.
where the first equality follows by the definition of bad, the second equality follows by the definitions of D (j) 1a and D (j) , the third and fourth equalities follow by the rule of multiplication when the intersection of two events is considered, the first inequality follows by the observation that Prob state←D (j) [ state ∈ bad|E 1 , . . . , E j−1 ] is at most 1, and the second inequality follows by definition of bad and the definition of p j .
Thus, if we consider the maximum over u = 1, . . . , n, we get that for any j:
Lemma 4 There exists a fixed constant c m (independent of P , y) such that if m j is computed as described above, then for all j, E[m j ] will be at most n cm /p j .
We prove the claim in two steps: the first step shows that with overwhelming probability, for all j, E new will compute values for m j such that m j ≤ min u (2n/ρ state
). Then we can use Lemma 3 to argue that when the states are chosen according to the process in step 1a, this value is not too large.
We analyze m j as follows: by Chernoff bounds (see Lemma 2) and our above notation, it follows that for any state state (j) , the probability that E new restarts the UAQK from state state (j) a total of 2n/ρ state (j) times without obtaining n successes is less than ( e 2 ) −n . We consider a total of n states (state (j) u for u = 1 . . . n), so by the union bound the probability that for any of these states state (j) we could run P from state (j) a total of 2n/ρ state (j) times without obtaining n successes is at most ( e 2 ) −n n.
Recall that E new repeatedly runs the UAQK starting from state state u results in n successful proofs. Thus, by our analysis, with probability at least 1 − ( e 2 ) −n n, the final m j value will be at most min u (2n/ρ state (j) u ). So we only need to consider min u (2n/ρ state (j) u ) and show that with high probability, this value is not too large. Recall that p j is the probability that when E new runs V new with P , step 4.j outputs ACCEPT, conditioned on the event that steps 4.1, . . . 4.(j − 1) output ACCEPT. We showed in Lemma 3 that given that we use the process described in step 1a to sample states state (j) u , we are guaranteed that Prob[ max u (ρ state (j) u ) < p j /2 ] is at most 2 −n . This means that with probability at least 1 − 2 −n , we will get min u (2n/ρ state (j) u ) ≤ 4n/p j . Now we combine this with the above and observe that this implies that with probability at least 1 − 2 −n − (
Furthermore, when this does not hold, the value of m j will be at most ( e 2 ) n/ /n . (E new will run the UAQK at most ( e 2 ) n/ times, but m j only counts the number of times we restart from state state (j)
1 . E new repeatedly loops over state
n , so it starts from state state (j) 1 at most ( e 2 ) n/ /n times.) Thus, we conclude that E[m j ] ≤ (4n/p j ) + 2( e 2 ) −n n * ( ( e 2 ) n/ /n ) < (4n/p j ) + 4 < 2 3 (n/p j ) , and we can easily set c m = 3 + so that
Now we are ready to analyze the running time E new . We will consider the running time of each step of the extraction procedure, then combine the results to prove the proposition.
Claim 1
Proof. Note that the value i is not used in step 1a, so it cannot affect the running time. Thus, we focus on the second part of the claim.
For each value of j, E new does the following: E new runs V new with P and checks to see whether steps 4.1 -4.j output ACCEPT. Then E new rewinds P to its initial state and then repeats until it gets n runs in which this occurs. Recall that, by assumption, when V new interacts with P , with probability p we are guaranteed that all of the steps 4.1 -4. output ACCEPT (because this is exactly the condition where honest verifier algorithm V new outputs 1). Thus, the probability that the first j steps output ACCEPT must be at least p. Then by Chernoff bounds (see Lemma 1), the probability that E new repeats the process 2n/p times without obtaining n successes is less than ( e 2 ) −n . Finally, even if E new does repeat more than 2n/p times without n successes, we are guaranteed that it runs the protocol at most ( e 2 ) n times before aborting and outputting ⊥. Thus, the expected running time for each value of j is at most 2n/p · T new (n) + (
We repeat this process for each value of j ∈ {1, . . . , }, so we conclude that the overall time spent in step 1a is at most 3 n cnew+1 /p. If we let c 1a = c new + log(3 ), the claim follows. (Recall that is a fixed constant.) 2
Claim 2 The running time of E new in step 1b is independent of i, and there exists a constant c 1b such that the expected running time of E new in step 1b is
Proof. Again, the value i is not used in this step, so we only need to bound the expected running time of E new . For each value of j, E new goes as follows. E new runs until one of the recorded states produces n successful proofs. At that point, it records as m j , the number of times that it restarted with state state (j) 1 . Thus, for each j, E new runs the UAQK at most nm j times, and in total the expected running time in this step will be at most j=1 nE[m j ]T new which is at most n cnew+1 j=1 E[m j ]. There is one additional detail, in that with some very small probability E new halts before obtaining n successful proofs. We still have to upper bound the running time in this case so that we can argue about expected running time of this step. Note that in this case, E new runs the UAQK at most ( e 2 ) n/ times, which means it restarts from state state (j) 1 at most ( e 2 ) n/ /n times. We stated above that, if E new halts before setting m j , we will consider m j to be ( e 2 ) n/ /n , so we can guarantee that the running time of this step will always be bounded by m j nT new . Then we can say that j=1 nE[m j ]T new is an upper bound on the expected running time in step 1b.
So all that remains is to bound j=1 E[m j ]. We showed in Lemma 4 that there exists a constant c m such that E[m ĵ ] ≤ n cm /p j , which in particular implies that E[mĵ] ≤ n cm /p j . Putting this all together, we conclude that the total expected running time in step 1b will be n cnew+1 j=1 E[m j ] ≤ n cnew+1+cm /p j ≤ n cnew+1+cm /p where the last relationship follows by definition of p j and p. If we let c 1b = c new + 1 + c m , then our claim follows.
2
Claim 3 The running time of E new in step 2 is independent of i, and there exists a constant c 2 such that the expected running time of E new in step 2 is O(
Proof. In this step, E new computes σ = σ(n), Θ = 4mĵq(n), and γ = 2(2mĵ) −1 q(n), and runs E P best (α, y, x) on σ(n) values of x using Θ different random strings for each. In each of these executions, E P best runs for exactly γ steps. Thus, the total running running time in this step will be Θγσ = 4mĵq(n) · 2(2mĵ) −1 q(n) · σ(n) = 4(2mĵ) q(n) 2 σ(n). Note that again, this quantity is independent of i, so we just have to show that in expectation it will be n c 2 p(n) for some fixed constant c 2 .
Recall that E new computes mĵ by taking min j m j and so
by Lemma 4 above, we know that there exists constant c m such that
Recall also that by our definition, p = j=1 p j , which implies that max j p j ≥ p. This implies that min j n /p j ≤ n /p, and so
From above, we have that the expected running time for step 2 is E[4(2mĵ) q(n) 2 σ(n)] = 2 +2 E[m ĵ ]q(n) 2 σ(n). Adding the bounds on E[m ĵ ] gives an upper bound of 2 +2 σ(n)q(n) 2 n cm /p. Both σ(n) and q(n) are guaranteed to be polynomial, so we can assume that there exists c σ , c q such that σ(n) is at most n cσ and q(n) is at most n cq . Thus, if we let c 2 = c σ +2c q +c m + +2, we get that the running time of this step is at most n c 2 /p as desired.
Combining the steps to prove the proposition: In each of these steps we have seen that the running time is independent of i. Adding the running times for steps 1 and 2, we get that the expected running time of E new will be at most n c 1a /p + n c 1b /p + n c 2 /p for constants c 1a , c 1b , c 2 . If we let c = c 1a + c 1b + c 2 , the proposition follows.
2 Success probability of the extraction procedure.
Proposition 2 There exist negligible functions ν 1 , ν 2 such that for any polynomial-sized circuit families {P n } n∈N and {S n } n∈N , for sufficiently large n, for any y ∈ L U ∩ {0, 1} n , if P n succeeds with probability greater than ν 1 (n), then with probability at least 1 − ν 2 (n), E new P produces bits consistent with a valid witness on all positions chosen (potentially adaptively) by S n .
Proof.
For any circuit P n , and n-bit strong y, let f accept (P n , y) be the probability that P n causes the honest verifier V to accept on input y. For any pair of circuits P n , S n , and n-bit string y, let f valid (P n , S n , y) be the probability that E new P produces bits consistent with a valid witness on all positions chosen (potentially adaptively) by S n .
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We will Proposition 2 by proving that the extractor satisfies the following property:
Definition 13 For any polynomial-size circuit families {P n } n∈N and {S n } n∈N , there exists negligible function ν such that for sufficiently large n, for any y ∈ L U ∩ {0, 1} n , min(f accept (P n , y), 1 − f valid (P n , S n , y)) ≤ ν(n).
Claim 4 The property described in Definition 13 holds with respect to a given extraction algorithm iff the first property in Definition 1 holds with respect to that extraction algorithm.
Proof. Recall that the original definition of UAQK (Definition 1) required that there exist negligible functions ν 1 , ν 2 such that for any poly-sized circuit families {P n } n∈N and {S n } n∈N , for sufficiently large n, for any y ∈ L U ∩ {0, 1} n , if f accept (P n , y) > ν 1 (n) then f valid (P n , S n , y) ≥ 1 − ν 2 (n). First, note that we can equivalently combine ν 1 , ν 2 into a single negligible function ν. (If ν 1 , ν 2 are both negligible, then max(ν 1 , ν 2 ) is also a negligible function.) Next, note that the statement "if f accept (P n , y) > ν(n) then f valid (P n , S n , y) ≥ 1 − ν(n)" is equivalent to saying "min(f accept (P n , y), 1 − f valid (P n , S n , y)) ≤ ν(n)." Finally, Definition 1 requires that the negligible functions work for all circuit families {P n }, {S n }, while Definition 13 allows a different function for each pair of circuit families. However, we can show these two notions are equivalent using the techniques from [Bel02] .
Now we need only show that the extractor we described satisfies Definition 13. We begin by defining some shorthand. Let ρ be the probability that the honest verifier accepts when running a UA P UA (·, ·), V UA (·) with P best , i.e., with P starting in state beststateĵ. Let R good (P best , α, y) be the set of all random tapes r such that E P best (α, y, ·) with coins r produces bits consistent with some valid witness. Let R fast (P best , α, y, γ) be the set of all random tapes r such that E P best (α, y, ·) 6 with coins r runs in time less than γ. (We omit the parameters when they are clear from context and just refer to these sets as R good and R fast .)
For any P n , y, let fail R (P n , y) be the event that when P best , α, and r 1 , . . . , r Θ are computed according to E P n new (y, ·), for all θ ∈ {1, . . . , Θ} it is the case that r θ / ∈ R good ∩ R fast . Let f R (P n , y) be the probability that fail R (P n , y) occurs (over the choice of E new 's random tape).
Next, we prove a useful claim about R good and R fast .
Claim 5 There exists a negligible function ν such that for all {P n } and all y ∈ {0, 1} n , if we condition on the event that E new computes mĵ such that mĵ ≥ n 2ρ , then the probability of fail R (P n , y) is at most ν(n).
Proof.
Recall that E new computes α = n 2mĵ . Thus, the conditioning event means that we consider the case where α ≤ ρ. Then, by the properties of the universal argument of Theorem 1 for each random choice of r θ , with probability α/q(n) we are guaranteed that E P best (α, y, x) (using r θ as coins) produces bits w x of a valid witness w , i.e. r θ ∈ R good .
We have to guarantee that for one of our r θ , E P best (α, y, x) both produces correct results and finishes within γ steps. Recall that E new computes γ as 2 * (2mĵ) −1 q(n) = 2(n/α) d+1 q(n). By the properties considered in considered in Theorem 1, we know that for all y, P , the expected running time of E P best (α, y, ·) is (n/α) d . Thus, by Markov's inequality, the probability (over choice of r θ ), that E P best (y, ·) will run in time more than γ = 2(n/α) d+1 q(n) is at most (n/α) d /(2(n/α) d+1 q(n)) = α/(2nq(n)). Or equivalently, we can say that the probability that r θ / ∈ R fast is at most α/(2nq(n)). Combining these we find that the probability that a random r θ is in R good ∩ R fast , i.e. that E P best (α, y, ·) runs in time less than γ and produces bits of a valid witness, is at least ρ = α/q(n) − α/(2q(n)) = α/(2q(n)). We conclude that since we use Θ = 4mĵq(n) = 2nq(n)/α random choices of r θ , then by Chernoff bounds, with all but negligible probability it is guaranteed that for at least one θ ∈ 1 . . . Θ, we will have r θ ∈ R good ∩ R fast , i.e. at least one of the resulting extractors E P best (α, y, ·) with E using r θ as coins, will always produce bits consistent with some valid witness and will finish in less than γ steps on all the values of x that we use.
Claim 6 There exists a negligible function ν such that for all {P n } and all y ∈ {0, 1} n , with probability at least 1 − ν(n), E new computes mĵ ≥ n 2ρ .
Recall that mĵ = min j m j , where m j is the number of times we had to restart P , V new from state state
1 before some state state
n } produced n successful runs (runs in which step 4.j output ACCEPT).
We begin by considering each value of j separately. For a fixed j, let us again use ρ (j) state to denote the probability that step 4.j outputs ACCEPT when P and V new start in state state (j) corresponding to the end of step 4.(j − 1). By Chernoff bounds (see Lemma 2), it is guaranteed that for any state, the probability that the number of repetitions is less than n 2ρstate and yet we obtain n successful runs is at most 2( 4 e ) −n/2 , which is clearly negligible. We run this experiment for n states state n so by the union bound, the probability that for any of these states we obtain n successful runs in less than n 2ρstate repetitions is also negligible. This means that the probability that m j < n 2ρ beststate j (for any fixed j) is negligible. Now, we run this process for each j ∈ 1 . . . . Since is a constant, again by the union bound, the probability that E new finds any m j , beststate j such that m j ≤ n 2ρ beststate j is negligible. Thus it must hold that, for the chosen valueĵ and state beststateĵ, with all but negligible probability it will be the case that mĵ ≥ n 2ρ beststateĵ = n 2ρ as desired.
Combining the two, we conclude that f R (P n , y) is negligible for all {P n } and {y n }, i.e. with all but negligible probability, it will be the case that E new gets a random tape such that for at least one value of θ, r θ ∈ R good ∩ R fast . Now, if there exists r θ ∈ R good ∩ R fast , that means that there exists at least one tape for which E r θ (α, y, x) produces correct answers for all values of x. We argue that as long as this happens, we will be guaranteed that with overwhelming probability, E new will produce correct answers on any sampleable set of inputs i. We show this based on the collision resistance of the hash function and the binding property of the commitment scheme. The intuition is that if this were not the case, then we could use E new and S to build a polynomial time adversary for either the commitment scheme or the hash function.
Recall that, for each r θ , E new runs E r θ to extract all the bits of s, dec s , root, dec root , w i , auth i . If it finds one r θ for which all the values extracted are consistent with one another and with C root and C s , then there are only two possibilities. If at some point it finds another r θ which produces another consistent set of values s , dec s , root , dec root , w i , auth i for which w i = w i , then it outputs ø. Otherwise it will output the value w i . Note that, if fail R (P n , y n ) does not occur, then there is one r θ which will always produce consistent values, and these values will correspond to a valid witness w. Thus, the only case where E new will not output bits of this witness is when there exists another r θ such that E r θ also produces values which are consistent for some i ∈ I, but where w i = w i . We argue that if S can find a set of bits I for which this happens with probability that is not negligible, then we can build a polynomial time adversary for either the hash function or the commitment scheme.
Let fail hash be the event that S produces a set I such that for some i ∈ I, there is some r θ , r θ on E new 's random tape such that E r θ produces values which are consistent but where root = root and w i = w i . Let f hash (P n , S n , y) be the probability that fail hash occurs (over the choice of E new 's random tape).
Let fail comm be the event that S produces a set I such that for some i ∈ I, there is some r θ , r θ on E new 's random tape such that E r θ produces values which are consistent but where root = root . Let f comm (P n , S n , y) be the probability that fail comm occurs (over the choice of E new 's random tape).
Finally, recall that f accept (P n , y) is the probability that P causes the honest verifier V to accept on input y.
Claim 7 Let f (P n , S n , y) = min(f hash (P n , S n , y), f accept (P n , y)), and for each n, let f (P n , S n ) be the maximum value of f (P n , S n , y) over all n-bit y ∈ L U . If H n is a family of collision resistant hash functions secure against non-uniform adversaries, then f (P n , S n ) is negligible.
Suppose there exist polynomial sized circuit families {P n } and {S n } such that f (P n , S n ) is not negligible. Then will we construct a polynomial sized circuit family {B n } which attempts to break the collision resistance property of the hash function.
In what follows, we will construct a non-uniform adversary B which runs in expected polynomial time, and breaks the collision resistance property with some probability that is not negligible. However, it is straightforward to convert such an adversary into a family of circuits which has strict polynomial size and still succeeds with probability that is not negligible.
For each value of n, let y n be an element of L U such that f (P n , S n , y) is maximized, and let p n = f accept (P n , y n ). Assume B is given p n , y n , P n , S n as part of it's non-uniform advice string.
B will receive a hash function h * from it's challenger. With probability p n , it will abort immediately. (This will help guarantee expected polynomial time.)
Note that S gets to choose it's set I adaptively, based on E new 's responses. Thus, if we want to use S to construct an adversary B for the collision resistance property, we need to ensure that B can provide responses which from the view of S are indistinguishable from what E new would give. That means we need to somehow sample a state beststate from the same distribution that E new uses. To do this we will essentially run the algorithm of E new .
The only issue is that we need to embed the challenge function h * into the first message of one of the instances of P , V in step 1a. Then, we can argue that with at least nonnegligible probability, this h * will be the one used in beststate, and so when the event fail hash occurs, that will imply a collision in our hash function h * . This is a bit tricky because we don't know how many times P , V will be restarted in step 1a. To deal with this we will first choose a positive integer λ from a distribution where each value λ is chosen with probability 1/2 λ . (Essentially, this corresponds to a guess that there will be 2 λ restarts in step 1a.) Then we will pick in integer β uniformly at random from {1, . . . , 2 λ }. (This corresponds to guessing which restart will lead to the chosen beststate.) So, our final algorithm B will first choose λ and β as described above. Then it will run E new , but in the βth restart in step 1a, it will use h * instead of choosing a new h at random. (Note that this produces an identical distribution.) It will run S to adaptive choose inputs for this E new . If at any point, in step 2 of E new , there are a pair of tapes r θ and r θ such that E produces sets of values (s, dec s , root, dec root , w i , auth i ) and (s , dec s , root , dec root , w i , auth i ) such that root = root and w i , auth i and w i , auth i both verify with respect to root but w i = w i , it will find and return the first pair of different values in the authentication chains auth i and auth i .
Now we have to argue that B runs in expected polynomial time, and that B succeeds in finding a collision with probability that is not negligible. First we consider the running time.
Let T E (n) be the expected running time of E P n new (y n ), and let T S (n) be the (polynomial) size of S n . Then, the expected running time of B will be at most p(n)T E (n)T S (n). (Since the probability that B aborts immediately is independent of the running time of E P n new .) Recall that by Proposition 1, T E (n) ≤ n c p(n) , so we can conclude that the expected running time of B will be n c T S (n) which is a polynomial.
To analyze B's success probability we note that, if it is in fact the case that the βth restart results in state beststate, then B will succeed with exactly the same probability that the event fail hash occurs in the real game. Thus, we have only to argue that with nonnegligible probability, B guesses the correct value for β. First, let N be the number of restarts that occur in step 1a in a given run of the protocol. Now, the probability that B chooses λ such that N ≤ λ ≤ 4N is at least 1
(To see this, note that for any λ , the probability that λ ≥ λ is between 1/2 λ−1 and 1/2 λ+1 .) If B does choose λ in this range, then the probability that B chooses the right restart β, is at least 1 4N . Thus, B's success probability is at least 1 8N 2 f hash (P n , S n , y n ). Finally, recall that we showed in Proposition 1 that E new runs in expected time T E (n) ≤ n c /f accept (P n , y n ). Furthermore, by Markov's inequality, on any given run the probability that E new runs in time greater than 2T E (n) is at most 1/2. So with probability at least 1/2, N will be at most 2T E (n) (since N must be less than the running time E new ). Thus, B will succeed with probability at least 1 2 1 32T E (n) 2 f hash (P n , S n , y n ) = 1 64(n c /faccept(P n ,yn)) 2 f hash (P n , S n , y n ) = 1 64n 2c f accept (P n , y n ) 2 f hash (P n , S n , y n ) ≥ 1 64n 2c min(f accept (P n , y n ), f hash (P n , S n , y n )) 3 , which is not negligible as long as f (P n , S n ) = min(f accept (P n , y n ), f hash (P n , S n , y n )) is not negligible.
Claim 8 If p(n) is polynomial, S is polynomial time, and P szk (·, ·), V szk (·) is a statistical zero-knowledge argument of knowledge, and (SHTGen, SHCom, SHVer, SHTCom, SHDec, SHTDec) is a commitment scheme, then the event fail comm can occur with at most negligible probability.
This proof is very similar to the one above for Claim ??. The only major difference is that in addition to providing the challenge commitment parameters to P * , B also has to simulate an argument of knowledge of the corresponding trapdoor. However, because the argument is statistical zero knowledge, the resulting distribution is statistically indistinguishable from the one produced by the real E new , and so the lemma follows by the same arguments as we used above.
Thus, we conclude that there exist negligible functions ν hash , ν comm , ν R such that for all n, for all y n , f R (P n , y n ) < ν R (n), min(f accept (P n , y n ), f hash (P n , S n , y n )) < ν hash (n) and min(f accept (P n , y n ), f comm (P n , S n , y n )) < ν comm (n). Combining these, implies that for all y n , min(f accept (P n , y n ), f hash (P n , S n , y n )+f comm (P n , S n , y n )+f R (P n , y n )) < ν hash (n)+ν comm (n)+ ν R (n). If neither fail hash nor fail comm nor fail R occurs, then the extractor succeeds on all the indices produced by S, so if we set ν = ν hash + ν comm + ν R , this implies that min(f accept (P n , y n ), 1 − f valid (P n , S n , y n )) < ν(n) which is negligible as desired.
Thus, we have shown both propositions, which completes our proof of Theorem 5. 2
C Constructing a Special ZKS Scheme on CRHFs
Recall that we require a zero-knowledge property which is stronger than the standard definition [MRK03] in two ways: (1) it holds even for all the parameters output by the simulator set-up algorithm, even when the adversary selects the randomness used for the set-up, and (2) the simulated commitment algorithm just runs the honest commitment algorithm on an empty database. Here we will show that we can construct such a ZKS scheme based on any family of collision-resistant hash functions. Trapdoor commitments. We begin by identifying a trapdoor commitment scheme with the analogous properties. Here we consider a variant of the Feige and Shamir scheme [FS90], as described by Fischlin [Fis01] . This construction is based on a non-trapdoor commitment scheme, and a secure one-way function (OWF).
The idea is that we can use a OWF to identify a graph in which, with high probability, it is hard to find a Hamiltonian cycle (by Karp reduction to Directed Hamiltonian Cycle). This graph forms the parameters for the trapdoor commitment scheme (together with the parameters for the non-trapdoor scheme). To commit to 0, the committer applies a random permutation to the graph, and commits (using the non-trapdoor commitment scheme) to the entries in the resulting adjacency matrix. To commit to 1, the committer forms an adjacency matrix for a graph which has only a Hamiltonian cycle, and no other edges, and uses the basic commitment scheme to commit to the entries in this matrix. Finally, to open a commitment to 0, the committer opens all entries, and reveals the permutation, and to open to 1, the committer opens only the entries in the cycle. Note that a commitment that could be opened to both 0 and 1 would imply a Hamiltonian cycle on the original graph. On the other hand, a simulator who knew such a cycle could easily form a commitment to 0 and then open it to 1. Our simulated set-up algorithm will therefore derive a graph for which it can identify a cycle. Now, we consider our stronger (i.e., statistically secure) properties. We will instantiate the underlying non-trapdoor commitment with a two-round statistically hiding commitment (which can be built from CRHFs [HM96]), where the first round (receiver to committer) is treated as the set-up algorithm, and the second (committer to receiver) as the commitment itself. Because of the statistical hiding property, we get that for all parameters, the resulting commitment is statistically hiding, even given any auxiliary information. Moreover, this also achieves statistical trapdoorness.
Next note that any graph derived from a OWF as described above will have a cycle. Thus, for any parameters output by the simulation set-up algorithm, and for any relevant auxiliary information, the simulator's trapdoor decommitments will be identical to or indistinguishable from valid decommitments. Note also that the simulated committer can just form a commitment to 0, without knowing the trapdoor, and then later use the trapdoor to open this commitment to 0 or 1. Thus we obtain a trapdoor commitment scheme with properties analogous to those that we require from our ZKS instantiation.
Mercurial Commitments. At a high level, a mercurial commitment scheme is a trapdoor commitment scheme which allows for two different types of commitments (hard and soft commitments), and two different types of opening procedures (hard openings and soft openings). It has been shown [CHL + 05] that zero-knowledge sets can be built from any mercurial commitment scheme. Thus, our next step is to find a mercurial commitment scheme with strong zero-knowledge properties. The only mercurial commitment scheme given in [CHL + 05] that is built from general assumptions is based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, which require trapdoor permutations. Thus, we instead look at the results of [CDV06], who present a mercurial commitment scheme based on any trapdoor commitment.
The basic construction proceeds as follows: The set-up algorithm generates the parameters for the trapdoor commitment scheme. A hard commitment to bit b is a pair of commitments, the first to b, the second to 1 − b. A soft commitment is a pair of commitments to 0. A soft opening opens commitment b to 0, while a hard opening opens both commitments.
Note that, using the above trapdoor commitment scheme, (1) a simulator can form an honest soft commitment (a pair of trapdoor commitments to 0), and then use the trapdoor to open the component commitments to 0 or 1 as necessary, and (2) if the underlying trapdoor commitment is hiding for all parameters output by the simulated set-up algorithm, even when the adversary is given the trapdoor, then the same will hold for the resulting mercurial commitment scheme.
Zero-knowledge sets. Finally, we will see that we can build a satisfactory zero-knowledge sets scheme from the above mercurial commitment scheme, and a CRHF using the transformation of [CHL + 05] (which is itself a generalization of the construction of [MRK03]). We simply make the following observations about this transformation.
The ZKS set-up algorithm just runs the set-up algorithm of the underlying mercurial commitment scheme and identifies a hash function. The ZKS commitment algorithm forms a series of hard and soft commitments and combines them using a Merkle hash tree. A commitment to an empty database is a single soft commitment. The ZKS proof algorithm generates hard or soft openings for a combination of hard and soft commitments. We note the following: (1) Our simulator can form a simulated ZKS commitment by forming a single soft commitment, and this will be equivalent to an honest commitment to an empty database. (2) Our ZKS simulator can generate the appropriate proofs by gener-ating soft or hard openings for this commitment and subsequent commitments as necessary using the simulator for the mercurial commitment scheme. Since the underlying mercurial commitments are zero-knowledge for all parameters given the trapdoor, this ZKS simulator will also have those properties.
D Proof of Theorem 3
We now give the proof of Theorem 3.
Corrupt verifier. When the real-world verifier A is corrupted, our ideal-world simulator (i.e., the corrupt verifier in the ideal-world) upon receiving (Receipt) from F DbCom will behave as follows:
Commitment Phase. Receive (ZKSPAR, crs) from A (step 1). Execute the code of V on input (crs, ZKSPAR) (step 2). If V rejects then abort. Pick r ∈ {0, 1} k , set (c, dec) = Com(crs, zks = ZKSCom(ZKSPAR, {}, r)) and send c to A (step 3). Executes FormWitness(ZKSPAR, {}, r) to generate witness w, and then executes the code of UAP on input c||ZKSPAR||crs with witness zks||dec||w (step 4). Send (dec, zks) to A (step 5).
After the commitment phase has ended, run the extractor of the proof given by A in step 2, thus obtaining aux, ZKSTRAP.
Query/Answer Phase. For i = 1, . . . , m do: Receive x i from A. Send x i to F DbCom (step 6). Receive y i from F DbCom . Send (y i , π = ZKSSimProve(ZKSTRAP, x i , y i , r)) to A (step 7).
Finally outputs what A outputs. We will show that EXEC π H P ,A (k, x, z) and {IDEAL
F DbCom
H P ,Sim (k, x, z)} are computationally indistinguishable based on the zero-knowledge property of the ZKS scheme, the WI property of the UAQK, and the trapdoorness property of the commitment scheme. Consider the following sequence of games.
Game Real: run the honest prover algorithm. The output is EXEC π H P ,A (k, x, z). Game Hybrid a: (Trapdoor commitment) We proceed as in Game Real with the following exception. We run step 1 and step 2 according to the honest prover protocol. Then we rewind to extract (aux, ZKSTRAP). In step 3, we generate (c, aux c ) ← TCom(crs, aux) and send it to the adversary. Next, choose random r 1 , and generate zks 1 = ZKSCom(ZKSPAR, Db, r 1 ) and dec 1 ← TDec(aux c , zks 1 ). Then we proceed with step 4-7 as in the honest protocol, using dec = dec 1 and zks = zks 1 .
Let {Hyb a A (k, x, z)} be the output of the above experiment. By the trapdoorness property the two experiments are indistinguishable, i.e. {Hyb a A (k, x, z)} ≈ EXEC π H P ,A (k, x, z). Game Hybrid b: (Simulated WI witness) We proceed as in Game Hybrid a with the following exception. In step 4, we choose random r 2 , and generate zks 2 = ZKSCom(ZKSPAR, {}, r 2 ) and dec 2 ← TDec(aux c , zks 2 ). Then we use a witness formed using zks 2 , dec 2 and the empty database to run the UAQK. The rest of the game (steps 5-7) proceeds as in Game Hybrid a, using dec = dec 1 and zks = zks 1 , and the real Db. Let {Hyb b A (k, x, z)} be the output of the above experiment. We conclude that {EXEC π H P ,A (k, x, z)} ≈ {IDEAL
F DbCom H P ,Sim (k, x, z)}, and our construction satisfies Definition 12 in the corrupt verifier case.
Corrupt prover. When the real-world prover A is corrupted, our ideal-world simulator (i.e., the ideal-world prover) will behave as follows.
Commitment Phase. Execute step 1-5 as described in the honest verifier protocol. After commitment phase has ended successfully, and extract the circuit C Db which implicitly determines the database. (This is the challenging step -we describe exactly how this is done below.) Send C Db to the functionality.
Query/Answer Phase. When receiving a query x i from the functionality, send it in step 6 to A. When receiving a proof in step 7 for x i from A, if it is correct send (Open, 1, x) to the functionality, otherwise send (Open, 0, x) to the functionality.
Finally, output what A outputs. Extracting C Db . We now describe in more detail how the simulator generates the circuit C Db . Let C A be a circuit that has the same behavior as A. (Note that C A is guaranteed to have polynomial size.) Let A be a PPT algorithm which behaves as follows: It runs step 1-3 of the honest verifier algorithm interacting with C A , using the same coins that the simulator used. Then, A runs the prover side of the UAQK in step 4 by forwarding all messages to and from C A . Construct a corresponding circuit -we refer to the result as P A .
By the definition of quasi knowledge, we know that there exists an algorithm E, which when run on random string R and with oracle access to a UAQK prover P A that succeeds with probability p, runs in expected time poly(k)/p (for some polynomial independent of P A ) and correctly extracts bits of a valid witness with overwhelming probability as long as p is large enough.
We construct two other algorithms based on E P A R . The first, which we will call Db A , will proceed as follows. Let y be the statement corresponding to c||ZKSPAR||crs. On input x, Db A will run Eval on input x. Whenever Eval tries to access the ith bit of w, the algorithm will run E P A R (y, i ) and use the resulting bit as w i . (Here we must adjust the position i and use the adjusted value i to take into account the fact that the witness used for the UAQK is prepended with zks||dec.) Db A will then output whatever Eval outputs. The second algorithm, which we will call Pf A will proceed similarly, but it will run PfGen rather than Eval. This algorithm is not actually used by the simulator, but will be necessary for our security arguments.
Note that the result is 2 deterministic oracle algorithms. Furthermore, we can compute a fixed upper bound on the running time of these algorithms: if we run E P A R (y, 0), that tells us the running time T E of the extractor for this randomness 7 , so the total running time will be T E · |P A | · q(k) (or q (k)), where q, q are the polynomials defined in the local witness property of the ZKS scheme. Then we convert these algorithms into the equivalent circuits: Suppose the running time of these algorithms is O(t(k)). Then there is a corresponding circuit with size O(t(k) log(t(k))) with identical behavior. Our simulator will generate the circuit corresponding to Db A , which we will refer to as C Db , and send the result to F DbCom . (If this process takes longer than 2 k time, we abort.) Claim 12 The simulator described above runs in expected polynomial time.
Proof. Recall that the simulator begins by running A with the honest verifier, and only continues with extracting C Db if steps 1-5 execute successfully. First, consider just those executions where the steps 1-3 are successful. After a given execution of step 1-3, let p be the probability that A will cause the UAV to accept. At this point, we know that probability 1−p, the simulator will simply abort. If the simulator does not abort, then it will construct a circuit using the oracle algorithm E A R (y, ·), which by the UAQK property will have running time k c /p for some fixed constant c (which is independent of A , y, R). 8 As discussed earlier, we combine this with A and with Eval, and the resulting algorithm will have fixed running time k c /p · T A (k) · q(k) (where q is as defined in the local witness property, and T A is a polynomial describing the running time of A). Thus, we can construct a corresponding circuit of size k c /p log(1/p) for appropriate constant c (where again, c is independent of A , y, R), and if this takes longer than 2 k time, we abort. Now, we can say that at the point when the first 3 steps have been successfully completed, and the adversary has probability p of successfully completing the rest of the protocol, the expected running time of the rest of the algorithm is p · min(2 k , k c /p log(1/p)) = min(p · 2 k , k c log(1/p)) ≤ k c · k = k c +1 for fixed constant c . Note that c does not depend on the adversarial prover A or the statement y, which means it will be independent of the randomness used in steps 1-3. Thus, we can conclude that the expected running time of the second half of the algorithm is always k c +1 . Finally, as running the first three steps takes only polynomial time, we can conclude that the overall expected running time is at most polynomial.
Based on this, we can show that the output of the above simulator (i.e., the adversarial prover in the ideal game) is computationally indistinguishable from the output of the corrupt prover (i.e., the adversarial prover of the real game). Consider the following game:
Game Hybrid. Run as in the ideal-world game with the following two exceptions: Compute A as described above, and in addition to using E A R to compute C Db , also use it to extract the values zks, dec corresponding to the beginning of the witness. If the ZKS commitment zks produced by the extractor does not match the value sent in step 5, output "Commitment consistency error". If for any i, the response y i sent by the prover in step 7 does not match the value produced by C Db , output "ZKS consistency error".
Claim 13
For any A such that Game Hybrid outputs an error with negligible probability, then {EXEC π A,H V (k, x, z)} ≈ {IDEAL Note that, if the simulator does not abort, and the game does not output an error, then the two games are identical. Thus, we need only show that simulator aborts with the same probability as the honest verifier. Note that, if neither of the above errors occurs, then the only time the simulator aborts when the honest verifier would not is when the process of generating the extractor takes more than 2 k time. However, as argued above, this process should take O(poly(k)/p log(1/p)) time, where p is the probability that A will produce a valid proof. If this value is more than polynomial, that means p must be exponentially small. Thus, any run on which the extractor takes more than 2 k time is one where with
